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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OIF UTAH 
THE CHEMICAL AND 
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, 
Petitioner, 
-vs.-
TI-IE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9360 
BRIEF O·F RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties herein will be designated as follows: Peti-
tioner, the Chemical and Industrial Corporation, as 
''Chemical and Industrial Corporation,'' and respondent, 
State Tax Commission of Utah, as the "Tax Commis-
sion.'' Emphasis has been supplied. 
This is a proceeding to review an order and decision 
of the Tax Commission imposing a use tax liability and 
deficiency upon the Chemical and Industrial Corporation. 
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The deficiency assessment was based upon the purchase 
and furnishing of materials and supplies by the petitioner 
as the consumer of such supplies and materials delivered 
and stored in the state of Utah and used for the con-
struction of an ammonium nitrate plant of the United 
States Steel Corporation, Columbia- Geneva Division 
(hereinafter denominated Geneva). 
Three principal questions are presented by this ap-
peal. They are: (1) whether or not the petitioner was 
the owner of the materials at the time they ended their 
transit in interstate commerce; (2) \Vhether or not the pe-
titioner was present within the state of Utah and in pos-
session of the materials used in the construction of the 
facility during a taxable moment; and (3) whether or not 
the assessment of this deficiency to the petitioner consti-
tutes an undue burden upon interstate commerce or vio-
lates the provisions of the due process clause of the 
United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent agrees substantially with the state-
ment of facts as set forth by the petitioner. In addition 
thereto, the following facts are submitted: 
The deficiency in the present case arose out of a 
prime contract between the Columbia-Geneva Steel Di-
vision of United States Steel Corporation and Blaw-Knox 
Company, in which agreement the Blaw-I{nox Company 
agreed to furnish and pay for all labor and materials and 
services not furnished by Geneva and to do and to per-
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form all things necessary for the completion and con-
struction of an ammonium nitrate facility at Geneva, 
Utah. This agreement was made on the 6th day of July, 
1956. Blaw-Knox, in turn, subcontracted the ammonium 
nitrate facility to the Chemical and Industrial Corpora-
tion in an agreement dated November 13, 1956, in which 
the present petitioner agreed to purchase the materials 
and perform the work necessary for the completion of 
the ammonium nitrate facility. By contract dated No-
vember 23, 1956, the petitioner contracted with its wholly 
owned subsidiary, the Chemical and Industrial Construc-
tion Company, under the terms of which contract the 
Chemical and Industrial Construction Company agreed 
to furnish labor, tools and equipment necessary to per-
form the work. The petitioner subsequently purchased 
all necessary materials and supplies required for the per-
formance of the subcontract from vendors not residents 
of the state of Utah by contracts executed outside of the 
state of Utah. Such materials were then shipped by the 
petitioner in interstate commerce to the plant site in Utah 
where they were received by the Chemical and Industrial 
Construction Company. 
Because of the nature of the issues, the time of pas-
sage of title to the materials and supplies purchased be-
comes extremely important. To determine the passage of 
title to these materials it becomes necessary to analyze 
the import of the three main contractual documents which 
govern the purchase of the supplies, their shipment, and 
later storage and use in the state of Utah. A summary of 
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the three contracts, together with references to the actual 
contract documents, is set forth as follows: 
1. CONTRACT BETWEEN UNITED STATES 
STEEL CORPORATION, COLUMBIA-GENEVA DI-
VISION AND BLA W-KNOX COMPANY AS PRI-
MARY CONTRACTOR. 
Under the terms of this agreement, Blaw-Knox 
agreed to furnish and pay for all labor and materials and 
services not furnished by U. S. Steel and to do and per-
form all things necessary for the construction and comple-
tion of the work (Paragraph 1). Blaw-Knox was denomi-
nated the contractor, and it was further agreed that prior 
to the completion of the work by the contractor and the 
acceptance thereof by the owner the work was to remain 
at the risk of the contractor, and the contractor was to be 
responsible for all loss and damage however caused, 
whether or not due to the fault of the contractor. (Para-
graph 12) The work to be done was specified as furnish-
ing and paying for all labor, materials, supplies, services, 
tools, equipment, utilities, transportation facilities and 
plant not furnished by Geneva, and to do and perform all 
things necessary for the construction and completion of 
facilities for the production of anhydrous ammonia and 
associated nitrogen compounds. (Paragraph 1) Blaw-
Knox further agreed to pay all sales, use, excise, trans-
portation, privilege, and other taxes. (Paragraph 15) 
The agreement was denominated by the parties as a turn-
key contract. (Letter from E. W. Forker, Vice President 
and General Manager, of Blaw-I{nox Company to H. W. 
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( ~hristensen, Director of Purchases, Columbia-Geneva 
Steel Division, United States Steel Corporation, dated 
June 18, 1955, paragraph 15.) The Tax Commission found 
a turnkey contract to be a contract in which the seller or 
contractor agrees to build a plant or facility and to fur-
nish the complete facilities or plant installed and in oper-
ating condition to the extent of instructing employees of 
the purchaser in its operation, and that the final pay-
ment for the facility in such a contract is deferred until 
said facility is installed, operating and accepted by the 
purchaser. The contract further provided that Geneva 
could, under certain conditions, elect to complete the work 
itself, but that after so doing it should return any unex-
pended materials and supplies to Blaw-Knox. (Para-
graph 4) Final payment was not to be made until accept-
ance, and partial payments were not considered as ac-
ceptance of work not in conformance with the terms of 
the contract. (Paragraph 24) It then agreed to assume 
the risk of loss or damage to that portion of facilities so 
occupied. (Paragraph 12) 
Blaw-Knox did not purchase any materials or sup-
plies, instead if elected to subcontract most of the work 
to the Chemical and Industrial Corporation. As a result, 
the following contract was signed dated November 13, 
1956. 
2. CONTRACT BETWEEN BLAW-KNOX COM-
pANY AND THE CHEMICAL AND INDUSTRIAL 
CORPORATION. 
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This contract provided that petitioner was obliged 
to furnish all materials, supplies, equipment, labor, serv-
ices, etc., necessary for the construction of the ammonium 
nitrate plant. (Article 1) Petitioner agreed to be respon- • 
sible for all materials delivered and work performed until 
completed and final acceptance. It further agreed to pay 
all federal, state and local taxes levied upon the subcon-
tractor. (Article XXXI) The subcontract between Blaw-
I{nox Company and the Chemical and Industrial Corpo-
ration also contained the following significant provisions: 
''Article I. DEFINITIONs 
(c) The term 'Work' includes all labor and/or ma-
terials to be furnished by Subcontractor as pro-
vided in the Purchase Order, and, unless other-
wise provided in the Subcontract Documents, Sub-
contractor shall furnish and pay for all materials, 
labor, supervision, tools and equipment, adminis-
tration, transportation, handling, storage, serv-
ices, supplies, temporary sheds for housing work-
men, materials, tools and equipment, and other 
facilities necessary for the execution and comple-
tion of the Work.'' 
''Article XVIII. TITLE 
The title to all Work completed and in the course 
of construction at the site and of all materials 
which are delivered and stored at the site and 
which will necessarily he inrorporated into the 
Work as between Contractor, Owner and Subcon-
tractor, shall be in the Owner.'' 
The original contract was not incorporated in the 
subcontract by reference. Petitioner subsequently con-
tracted with its wholly owned subsidiary, Chemical and 
Industrial Construction Company. 
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3. CON':rHACT BETvVEEN CHEMICAL AND 
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION AND THE CHE_JII-
CAL AND INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION COM-
PANY DATED NOVEJ\IBER 23, 1956. 
This contract provided that the construction company 
was to furnish labor, tools and equipment to construct the 
ammonium nitrate facilities. The contract further pro-
vided that title to the materials delivered an.d stored at 
the site would necessarily be in Geneva Steel, which was 
denominated by the parties as the owner. (Tr. 142, 167-
174) (Emphasis supplied) 
Subsequently, petitioner purchased all the supplies 
and materials necessary for the fulfillment of the contract 
and shipped such materials and supplies in interstate com-
merce to the plantsite in Utah where they were received 
by the Chemical and Industrial Construction Company. 
All labor and services required in the construction work 
were then provided by the construction company as a 
wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner engaged in the 
actual construction of the facilities. 
The outline of the Chemical and Industrial Corpora-
tion's contractual relationships, as set out on Pages 14-15 
of this Brief may be helpful in reaching a determination 
of the issues. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I 
PETITIONER WAS THE OWNER OF THE 
:MATERIALS INVOLVED HEREIN DURING 
A TAXABLE MOMENT WITHIN THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
PoiNT II 
PETITIONER WAS PRESENT IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH AND IN POSSESSION OF 
THE MATERIALS HEREIN INVOLVED SO 
AS TO BE SUBJECT TO THE TAXING POW-
. ER OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
PoiNT III 
THE ASSESSMENT OF USE TAX AGAINST 
THE PETITIONER DOES NOT VIOLATE 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE NOR THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 
POINT IV 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN UNITED 
STATES STEEL CORPORATION, COLUM-
BIA-GENEVA DIVISION, AND THE BLAW-
l{NOX COMPANY WAS PROPERLY ADMIT-
TED INTO EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
PETITIONER WAS THE OWNER OF THE 
MATERIALS INVOLVED HEREIN DURING 
A TAXABLE MOMENT WITHIN THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
It is clearly shown by the evidence that the peti-
tioner vvas the original purchaser and that it did at one 
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time hold title to all of the materials so purchased and 
which are the subject matter of this assessment. The dif-
ference of opinion related to the time at which the peti-
tioner lost ownership of such materials. The Tax Com-
mission's position is based upon the interpretation of all 
pertinent contracts and may be set forth as follows : First, 
that it is impossible to impose upon the United States 
Steel Corporation terms to which it did not agree; and, 
that any attempt to determine the passage of title to the 
materials herein involved must necessarily include the 
agreement to which the United States Steel Corporation 
is a party. The only contract which meets these require-
ments is the contract dated July 6, 1956, of which the 
following paragraphs are pertinent: 
Paragraph 1. Description of the work. 
''Contractor shall furnish and pay for all labor, 
materials, supplies, services, tools, equipment, 
utilities, transportation facilities and plant, not 
furnished by owner, and do and perform all things 
necessary for the construction and completion of 
facilities for the production of anhydrous ammo-
nia and associated nitrogen compounds, which said 
work is described in owner's specification No. 
GW-55-31 ... " 
Paragraph 12 is titled "Responsibility for Work" 
and provides in part : 
"Prior to the completion of the work by Con-
tractor and the acceptance thereof by Owner, the 
work shall remain at the risk of Contractor and 
Contractor shall be responsible for all loss and 
damage to the work and shall repair, renew and 
make good, at its own expense, all such loss and 
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damage however caused, whether or not due to the 
fault of the Contractor and including, but not lim-
ited to loss or damage caused by collision, riot, 
fire or force or violence of the elements. To the 
extent that such loss or damage is not covered by 
the insurance to be maintained by Contractor here-
under, Contractor shall not be liable in the event 
that such loss or damage is due to the sole neg-
ligence of Owner's employees (unless such loss or 
damage directly results from directions given such 
employees by Contractor). In the event that, pur-
suant to the provisions of Subsection 24 (c), Owner 
accepts and occupies a portion of the facility prior 
to acceptance of the entire facilities, Owner shall 
assume all risk of loss or damage to such portion 
of the facilities.'' 
It was clearly understood between the parties that 
the United States Steel should not bear any tax burden 
regarding the construction of the facility. Paragraph 15, 
entitled ''Taxes,'' provides : 
''Contractor shall pay all contributions, taxes and 
premiums payable under Federal, State and local 
laws measured upon payroll of employees engaged 
in the performance of work under this contract 
and all sales, use excise, transportation, privilege, 
occupational, and other taxes as they were in force 
as of April 29, 1955, and at rates then existing 
applicable to materials and supplies furnished for 
work performed hereunder and shall save Owner 
harmless from liability for any such contributions, 
premiums, and taxes .... '' 
Section 4, entitled "Conditions Under \Yhich Owner 
May Complete Work,'' provides that the owner under cer-
tain conditions may finish the work by terminating his 
10 
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contract, and that having properly elected to do so the 
owner: 
''may enter upon the premises and take possession 
of all materials, tools, equipment, facilities and 
supplies thereon, and may finish the work with its 
own forces and may provide the necessary labor 
and additional materials, tools, equipment, facili-
ties and supplies for finishing the work, or Owner 
may employ any other person or persons to fin-
ish the said work .... Any unexpended materials, 
tools, equipment, facilities and supplies furnished 
by contractor for the work shall be returned to it 
following the completion thereof . ... " (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Paragraph 24, entitled'' Completion and Acceptance,'' 
provides that after the contractor has finished its con-
struction work that it is to carry on a test of mechanical 
functioning; that thereafter the owner may begin a two-
week testing period; and further provides in Subsection 
(b) that: 
"Contractor shall make written request for a.ccept-
ance of the work by Owner when in Contractor's 
opinion the specifications as to performance ex-
pressly guaranteed by Contractor hereunder have 
been met and determined by the result of one of 
the 48-hour test-runs a;nd all other work has been 
completed. Not later than thirty ( 30) da.ys after 
Contractor has submitted to Owner such request 
for acceptance, Own.er, if in a.greement, shall in 
writing accept the work .... " (Emphasis supplied) 
Subsection (c) of Paragraph 24 further provides : 
''In the event Owner wishes to occupy a portion 
of the ''Tork prior to acceptance of the entire work, 
such portion shall be tested and accepted under the 
11 
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procedures of this Section 24 subject only to the 
results of the final test of the integrated plant and 
after occupancy Owner shall assume all risk of loss 
or damage to such portion of the work.'' 
That there is no basis in the agreement between the 
United States Steel Corporation and Blaw-Knox Com-
pany for the position that title to all materials prior 
to their incorporation in the work was in the United 
States Steel Corporation is evidenced by the above-
cited provision 24 of the contract. Provision 24 in sub-
stance provides that the United States Steel Corporation 
shall accept the facilities upon completion and final test of 
the integrated plant by the contractor. United States Steel 
made no agreement, either with Blaw-Knox Company or 
wih the Chemical and Industrial Corporation or the 
Chemical and Industrial Construction Company, to re-
ceive title to these materials as personal property prior 
to their incorporation in the plant. This, therefore, places 
the tax liability clearly upon the subcontractor, Chemi-
cal and Industrial Corporation, as coming within the 
Sales and Use Tax Regulation No. 58, which states: 
''II. Where the contractor or subcontractor 
agrees for a lump sum to furnish materials, sup-
plies and necessary services, the sale to him of the 
materials and supplies is taxable as he becomes 
the final consumer or user .... The sales or use 
tax on materials and supplies expended or used in 
performance of a lump-sum contract is the cost of 
the contractor or subcontractor, and is not to be 
billed separately to the owner of the real 
property.'' 
12 
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From the foregoing contractual provisiOns, it is 
apparent that title to the materials and supplies furnished 
by the petitioner, delivered within the state of Utah, and 
intended to be incorporated in the facility at Geneva, did 
not pass to Geneva until final acceptance of the same by 
the United States Steel Corporation. 
It is further apparent that as the Chemical and In-
dustrial Construction Company never took title or agreed 
to perform anything except necessary labor upon the 
materials and supplies furnished, that the ownership of 
these materials and supplies during the time they were 
stored and used in Utah was necessarily in the Chemical 
and Industrial Corporation. 
Assuming, but not conceding, the interpretation of 
the contractual documents as contended by petitioner, it 
is submitted that the same result is forthcoming even 
though the prime contract between the United States 
Steel Corporation and Blaw-Knox Company is not used 
in making the determination. 
The petitioner contends that Article XVIII of peti-
tioner's subcontract with Blaw-Knox Company (herein-
after referred to as Blaw-Knox) is determinative of this 
issue. Article XVIII provides as follows: 
''The title to all work completed and in the course 
of construction at the site and all materials which 
are delivered and stored at the site and which 
shall necessarily be incorporated in the work, as 
between Contractor [Blaw-Knox], Owner [ Ge-
neva] and Subcontractor [petitioner] shall be in 
Owner.'' 
13 
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Petitioner interprets this article to mean that at the mo-
ment that the interstate shipment of the materials in ques-
tion ceased, the title to the materials passed instantly 
from petitioner to Geneva. Respondent, however, contends 
that such is not the meaning of Article XVIII and that 
even were we to concede that Article XVIII were to deter-
mine the point at which title to the materials passed to 
Geneva, that there would be a taxable moment when peti-
tioner would be subject to a use tax thereon. 
Article I of petitioner's contract with Blaw-Knox, 
although entitled "Definitions," provides as follows: 
" (c) The term 'work' includes all labor and/or 
materials to be furnished by Subcontractor [peti-
tioner] as provided in the Purchase Order, and, 
unless otherwise provided in the Subcontract Doc-
uments, Subcontractor shall furnish and pay for 
all materials, labor, supervision, tools and equip-
ment, administration, transportation, handling, 
storage, services, supplies, temporary sheds for 
housing workmen, materials, tools and equipment, 
and other facilities necessary for the execution and 
completion of the work.'' 
Thus, petitioner was required not only to purchase and 
store the materials for this project, but was required to 
provide the temporary sheds for storing the same. 
It is admitted that even by the clear terms of Article 
XVIII, the title to the materials did not pass from peti-
tioner to Geneva until the materials were ''delivered and 
stored at the site.'' (Emphasis supplied) 
16 
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Section 59-16-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides 
iu part: 
''There is levied and imposed an excise tax on the 
storage, use or other consumption in this state of 
tangible personal property purchased on or after 
July 1, 1937, for storage, use or other consumption 
in this state at the rate of two per cent of the sales 
price of such property." (Emphasis supplied) 
"Storage" is defined by Section 59-16-2, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as follows: 
'' (a) 'Storage' means and includes any keeping 
or retention in this state for any purpose except 
sale in the regular course of business of tangible 
personal property purchased from a retailer.'' 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Even construing Article XVIII most favorably to peti-
tioner it is respectfully submitted, since the material had 
to be delivered and stored by petitioner before title could 
conceivably pass to Geneva, that there was a taxable 
moment after the interstate shipment had ceased and be-
fore title rested in Geneva. See Southern Pacific v. Gal-
lagher, 306 U.S. 167, 59 S. Ct. 389, 83 L. Ed. 563 (1939); 
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 
182, 59 S. Ct. 396, 83 L. Ed. 595 ( 1939). 
This conclusion is further substantiated by Section 
59-16-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides 1n 
part: 
''For the purpose of the proper administration 
of this act and to prevent evasion of the tax and 
the duty to collect the same herein imposed, it shall 
17 
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be presumed that tangible personal property sold 
by any person for delivery in the state is sold for 
storage, use or other consumption in this 
state .... '' 
It is clear that the materials and supplies in question 
were sold and purchased for storage, use and consumption 
in the state of Utah; they were then shipped to the state 
of Utah where they were stored, used and consumed. The 
Tax Commission contends that the activities of the peti-
tioner do constitute a keeping or retention or storing in 
this state of tangible personal property and that this 
keeping or retention is a proper basis upon which the 
Tax Commission may levy a use tax. To rule otherwise is 
to say that the parties to a construction contract, by in-
tricate manipulation, may purchase materials outside the 
state for storage, use and consumption within the state, 
in such a way as to avoid paying a tax to the state alto-
gether. To so find is to discriminate against intrastate 
contractors and place intrastate sellers in a position 
where they cannot compete with interstate sellers. 
PoiNT II 
PETITIONER WAS PRESENT IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH AND IN POSSESSION OF 
THE MATERIALS HEREIN INVOLVED SO 
AS TO BE SUBJECT TO THE TAXING POW-
ER OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Assuming for purposes of argument that petitioner 
was not the ''owner'' of the said materials, we submit that 
the petitioner was present in the state of Utah and in pos-
session of the materials used in the construction of the 
18 
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facility during a taxable moment. The Supreme Court of 
the United States had occasion to examine a factual 
situation very similar to this one in the case of Kansas 
City Str,uctural Steel Co. v. State of Arkansas, 269 U. S. 
148, 46 S. Ct. 59, 70 L. Ed. 204 (1925). In that case the 
state of Arkansas had levied a fine of $1,000.00 against 
the Kansas City Structural Steel Co. (a Missouri Cor-
poration) for doing business within the state of Arkan-
sas prior to obtaining· permission. On Mar. 3, 1921, the 
plaintiff company bid on a bridge job to be constructed 
in Arkansas. This bid was accepted, contingent upon the 
company's furnishing a bond. The bond was executed two 
days late~ in Missouri. On June 14, 1921, the plaintiff 
company sublet all the work except the erection of the 
steel superstructure to the Young Construction Co., a 
Kansas partnership. Subsequently, the plaintiff company 
shipped materials from its Kansas City plant addressed 
to itself, which were delivered to its subcontractor at 
Wilmot, Arkansas, and used by the latter in the work 
done by the subcontractor. On August 17, 1921, after the 
subcontractor had substantially completed his work, 
plaintiff company obtained permission to do business in 
the state of Arkansas. However, the state charged the 
plaintiff with doing business prior to the date upon which 
it obtained permission, and the statutory fine of $1,000.00 
was imposed, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas. The plaintiff company then took the matter to 
the United States Supreme Court on writ of certiorari. 
The question on appeal was whether the acts done 
by the plaintiff company were in interstate commerce or 
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whether the company did business of a local, intrastate 
nature in Arkansas prior to obtaining permission. The 
United States Supreme Court affirmed that the company 
had done business of a local, intrastate nature in Arkansas 
before obtaining permission. In reasoning thusly, the 
Court stated : 
'' ... In the case now before the court, the construc-
tion of •the bridge necessarily involved some work 
and business in Arkansas, which were separate and 
distinct from any interstate commerce that might 
be involved in the performance of the contract. 
From the beginning, transactions local to Arkan-
sas were contemplated. In fact, plaintiff in error 
obtained permission to do business in Arkansas 
in order to be authorized to erect the steel super-
structure - the part of the work it had not sublet. 
But before obtaining such permission, it made the 
bid and signed the contract in Arkansas; it shipped 
from Kansas City to itself at Wilmot the materials 
for the work it had sublet, and, after the interstate 
transit had ended, delivered them to the subcon-
tractor who used them in the work. We need not 
consider whether, under the circumstances shown, 
the making of the bid, the signing of the contract 
and execution of the bond would be within the 
protection of the commerce clause, if these acts 
stood alone. But it is certain that, when all are 
taken together, the things done by plaintiff in error 
in Arkansas before obtaining the permission con-
stitute or include intrastate business. The delivery 
of the materials to the subcontractor was essential 
to the building of the bridge, and that was oo 
intrastate and not an interstate transaction. The 
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fact that the materials had moved from Missouri 
into Arkansas did not make the delivery of them 
to the subcontractor interstate commerce. So far 
as concerns the question here involved, the situa-
tion is the equivalent of what it would have been 
if the materials had been shipped into the State 
and held for sale in a warehouse, and had been 
furnished to the subcontractor by a dealer. We 
think it plain that the plaintiff in error did busi-
ness of a local and intrastate character in Arkan-
sas before it obtained permission.'' (Citing cases.) 
(Emphasis supplied) 
In view of the foregoing language it would appear 
that the fact that the construction company shipped mate-
rials addressed to itself for the completion of the contract 
in Arkansas convinced the Supreme Court that the con-
struction company was present and doing business in 
the state, although the materials were actually received 
and used by the subcontractor of the construction com-
pany. Furthermore, the court indicated that the inter-
state shipment had ceased prior to the time when the 
materials were finally delivered to the subcontractor, and 
that the delivery was of an intrastate character, evidenc-
ing the presence of the construction company. 
The storage and use in California of railroad supplies 
and equipment purchased outside ·the state by a l{entucky 
corporation which operated an interstate railroad, were 
held in Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167, 
59 S. Ct. 389, L. Ed. 583 (1939), to be intrastate events 
properly subjected to the California Use Tax, even as to 
articles ordered out of the state under specifications suit-
able only for utilization in interstate transportation facili-
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ties and installed immediately on their arrival at the Cali-
fornia destination. The Court said that there was a tax-
able moment when such goods had reached the end of their 
interstate transportation and had not begun to be con-
sumed in interstate operation, and that at that moment the 
tax on storage and use - retention and exercise of a 
right of ownership, respectively- was effective. The fur-
ther contention that the tax violated the due process 
clause because enacted for consumption of office and car 
supplies outside the state, upon their appropriation in 
California to the use of the whole system, was also re-
jected since the determination that the taxable event was 
the exercise of the property right in California justified 
the tax. 
And in Oklahoma Taa; Commission v. Stanolind Pipe 
Line Co. (CA lOth Oklahoma), 113 F. 2d 853, Cert. Den. 
311 U. S. 693, S. Ct. 75, 85 L. Ed. 448 (1940), the Okla-
homa use tax was held applicable to equipment and sup-
plies purchased outside Oklahoma by a Maine corpora-
tion for immediate installation and repairs on its inter-
state pipe lines through Oklahoma. The Court, following 
the Sottdhern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher case, supra, held 
that the retention and exercise of a right of installation of 
the property after the termination of its movement in in-
terstate commerce and before the beginning of its use and 
consumption in the interstate business, was said to come 
well within the terms of the statute. See also Chicago 
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Johnson, 19 Cal. 2d 162, 119 P. 2d 
945 (1941); Sugarman Y. Sta.te Board of Equalizatio·n, 51 
Cal. 2nd 361, 333 P. 2d 333 (1958); Custom Built Homes 
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Co. v. Kansas State Commission of Revenue and Taxa-
tioll, 184 l(au. 31, 334 P. 2d 808 (1959); and United Air-
craft Corporation v. Conrn.elly, 145 Conn. 176, 140 Atl. 
2<1 486 (1958). 
In the instant case, therefore, we submit that the 
Commission was justified in finding that the petitioner 
was present within the state of Utah after the interstate 
shipment of the materials in question had ceased, and 
that the petitioner thereupon delivered possession of the 
materials to its subcontractor for storage or further use 
in the construction project. This would constitute a "use" 
within the meaning of Section 59-16-2 (b), Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, as amended. It would also be sufficient to 
justify the Commission in finding the petitioner to be 
present within the state during a taxable moment. See 
Chicago Bridge & I ron Co. v. J ohn.son, 19 Cal. 2d 162, 
119 P. 2d 945 (1941). 
PorNT III 
THE ASSESSMENT OF USE TAX AGAINST 
THE PETITIONER DOES NOT VIOLATE 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE NOR THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 
For the reasons stated in Point II hereof, we respect-
fully submit that the assessment of this deficiency to the 
petitioner would not unduly burden interstate commerce 
or violate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. See Kansas City Struc-
tural Steel Co. v. State of Arkan·sas, 269 U. S. 148, 46 S. 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ct. 59, 70 L. Ed 204 (1925) which holds that shipments in 
all respects similar to those in question here had termi· 
nated their transit in interstate commerce prior to their 
delivery to the subcontractor. 
PoiNT IV 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN UNITED 
STATES STEEL CORPORATION, COLUl\1:-
BIA-GENEV A DIVISION, AND THE BLA "\V-
KNOX COMPANY WAS PROPERLY ADMIT-
TED INTO EVIDENCE. 
The contract between Geneva and Blaw-Knox Com-
pany dated July 6, 1956, is clearly admissible. The pro-
priety of this admission can be readily seen after careful 
scutiny of the issues herein. The question of paramount 
importance is that of the passage of title to the materials 
and supplies used in the performance of the work and 
purchased by the petition~r. Clearly, an allegation or 
agreement by petitioner with some third party is not 
enough to vest title to the materials in Geneva without 
its consent. Especially is this true if the prime contract 
provided other prerequisites to the passage of title such 
as acceptance or completion of the work. 
Petitioner's chief objection is that the contract lacks 
materiality and serves to confuse the issues. The Tax 
Commission submits that the materiality of this contract 
is clearly shown from the very nature of the contentions 
of the petitioner. 
Even assuming the ''remote relevancy'' suggested 
by the petitioner, the contract should have been received. 
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Davis, Volume II, Administrative Law, Section 14.01, 
suggests that the direction of movement on the evidence 
problem throughout the legal system, in the judicial 
processes as well as the administrative processes, is to-
ward (1) replacing rules with discretion, (2) admitting 
all evidence that seems to the presiding officer relevant 
and useful, and ( 3) relying upon the kind of evidence on 
which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in se-
rious affairs. Admitting the fact that the Administrative 
Procedure Act has not been enacted in this state as yet, 
it is submitted that an administrative agency, sitting as 
a quasi-judicial body, should not be strictly bound by the 
exclusionary rules of evidence for jury cases. The pro-
visions of Section 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure 
Act appear eminently fair. This Section provides: 
''Any oral or documentary evidence may be re-
ceived, but every agency shall as a matter of pol-
icy provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, imma-
terial or unduly repetitious evidence and no sanc-
tion shall be imposed or rule or order be issued 
except upon consideration of the whole record or 
any such portion thereof as may be cited by any 
party and as supported by and in accordance with 
the reliable probative and substantial evidence.'' 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Petitioner cites several cases in support of its con-
tention that this contract was improperly received. The 
case of General Foods Corporation v. Brannon (7th Cir. 
1948), 170 F. 2d 220, involving an attempt by the Secre-
tary of Agriculture to impose certain sanctions upon 
General Foods Corporation and others because of an 
alleged attempt to manipulate the price of rye. The case 
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was tried before a referee and heard and decided by a 
Judicial Officer as though respondents were judged with 
and found to have been engaged in a conspiracy, this not-
withstanding the Government's express disclaimer that 
any conspiracy or agreement existed. The totality of the 
respondents' activities was relied upon as an incriminat-
ing circumstance against each, a case hardly determi-
native of the propriety of admission in the present case. 
The case of Glen. Alden Coal Co. v. Unemployment 
Compensation Boa.rd of Review, 168 Pa. Super 534, 79 
Atl. 2d 796 (1951), cited by petitioners, held only that 
the finding of an administrative board may not be based 
exclusively on incompetent evidence, and the case of 
Phillips v. Unemployment Compen.sation Board of Re-
view, 152 Pa. Super 75, 30 Atl. 2d 718 (1943), held that 
the report of an investigator not himself a party to the 
hearing should be made a part of the record for the in-
formation of the Unemployment Compensation Board. 
The latter case is not inconsistent with the Tax Commis-
sion's position herein, and the totality of authority cited 
by petitioner does not justify any other course of action 
than that followed by the Tax Commission. 
Petitioner further objects to a series of questions 
propounded of l\1:r. Maynard Gage, Assistant Director of 
Purchases for Geneva, who assisted in the negotiation and 
signing of the contract in question, regarding the passage 
of title of materials purchased by petitioner. Petitioner 
contends the oral testimony eannot be introduced to vary 
terms of a written eontract. 
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As a general rule, petitioner is correct. However, 
this is not the case where the contract is ambiguous or in-
complete. In a number of cases, the courts have said that 
oral evidence is admissible to explain the writing. Where 
the instrument is fairly susceptible to more than one con-
struction, it is admissible to have the aid of pertinent 
facts and circumstances that will throw light on the inten-
tion of the parties to the contract in its execution. Penn 
Co. v. W aUace, 346 Pa. 532, 31 Atl. 2d 71, 156 ALR 1 
(1943); 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 1147. The contract 
in the instant case is apparently ambiguous as both pe-
titioner and the Tax Commission cite its paragraphs in 
an attempt to ascertain the passage of title. 
For the above reasons, the Tax Commission contends 
that it was proper to admit the contract in question into 
evidence, together with additional testimony relating 
thereto. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully urge that 
the use tax deficiency assessed against the petitioner 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
F. BURTON HOWARD, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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